We show that the claim of insecurity of the Y-00 (or αη) cryptosystem made by C. Ahn and K. Birnbaum in Phys. Lett. A 370 (2007) 131-135 even under ciphertextonly heterodyne attack, as well as the unfavorable security comparison between αη and an additive stream cipher for all kinds of attacks, is based on invalid extrapolations of Shannon's random cipher analysis to two concrete ciphers. We generalize earlier work on nonrandom ciphers to random ciphers like αη and show that arguments of the kind given by Ahn and Birnbaum can at best provide lower bounds on the average number of spurious keys seen by the eavesdropper and cannot even in principle establish insecurity of the system.
interpreted in the light of our results of Section 2 to provide lower bounds on N k which cannot be used to argue insecurity of any cipher. We also show that, for αη, a true unicity point is never reached for finite n under known-plaintext attacks, making them more information-theoretically secure than standard ciphers for those attacks contrary to the claim of [1] .
1 Average number of Spurious Keys N k and 'Unicity distance'
The general form of a non-random encryption system consists of an encryption map E k (·) applied by the sender Alice to a plaintext n-sequence X n = X 1 . . . X n of symbols each picked from an alphabet X resulting in a ciphertext n-sequence Y n = Y 1 . . . Y n :
with the ciphertext symbols belonging to a possibly different alphabet Y. Note that the encryption map is indexed by the secret key selected randomly from a possible set of values K and known only to Alice and the receiver Bob. The key length |K| is typically of the order of a few 100 bits for ciphers like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The ciphertext may be openly read by the eavesdropper Eve before reaching Bob, who applies a corresponding decryption map D k (·) to recover the plaintext:
For a random cipher, the only change in the above description is that the ciphertext is not determined by the key and plaintext alone as per Eq. (1) but rather includes an additional random variable R n generated by Alice for its complete specification:
The decryption map D k must function without Bob knowing R n so that Eq.
(2) is still enforced. Further details of this concept may be found in [3] -we note here that the 'data expansion' found in a random cipher usually necessitates the use of a larger ciphertext alphabet so that Y = X -the former may even be continuous as it is for αη under heterodyne attack.
Let us fix a particular attack on a fixed cryptosystem, random or otherwise, operating on a data sequence X n = X 1 . . . X n of length n. By 'a particular attack' we mean that the eavesdropper Eve is assumed to know the joint probability distribution Pr[X n Y n K] of the plaintext, ciphertext, and key, and is in possession of the corresponding ciphertext random variable Y n . In the case of αη, where information is coded into quantum states, one must additionally specify a quantum measurement whose result becomes the ciphertext Y n . In the case of αη under heterodyne attack, X = {0, 1} and Y is R 2 or C since the heterodyne measurement gives two real numbers. Actually, only the argument of the complex number result is useful to Eve and thus Y may be taken to be the circle S 1 . In this paper, we will consider only information-theoretic security (IT security) and allow unlimited computational power to Eve.
In the cryptography literature, beginning with Shannon [6] , the 'unicity distance' has been proposed as a measure of IT security of a cipher. The concept may loosely be defined as the smallest length of plaintext for which only one key value can lead to the observed ciphertext, thus marking the point where the system is totally broken. Unfortunately, for most data statistics, there is never a point where the key becomes fixed with probability one and the choice of a particular unicity point involves an implicit choice of a probability that is viewed as 'small enough' and must, in our opinion, be specified in any insecurity claims. In [6] , Shannon estimated the unicity distance of an ensemble of ciphers satisfying certain ideal conditions that are in general not satisfied for a given cipher. Even for Shannon's random cipher (Throughout this paper, we will use 'Shannon's random cipher ' to denote the ensemble of ciphers defined in [6] and 'random cipher ' to denote any cipher of the form of Eq. (3).), there is no point where the key is fixed with probability one. However, the probability that the key is erroneously determined by Eve at a designated 'unicity point' can be calculated for this case, as has been done by Hellman in [7] (see Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). This probability calculation appears extremely difficult to do for any concrete cipher, random or otherwise.
In view of the generic non-existence of a true unicity point for a cipher, we prefer to work with a closely related concept defined by Hellman [7] and used also by Beauchemin and Brassard [8] . This is the average number of spurious keys N k seen by the attacker that we define below following [8] .
Under a given attack, for each ciphertext y, we define the set K y as:
Thus K y is the set of keys that could give rise to the observed ciphertext y.
Since only one of these keys is the actual one used, the number of spurious keys N k (y) is
The average number of spurious keys N k is defined to be the expectation of N k (y) over Y:
Since each N k (y) is non-negative, if N k = 0, N k (y) = 0 for all y and the cipher is broken with probability one.
We stress here that we do not consider N k by itself to be an operationally meaningful IT security measure, although it may well provide bounds on such a measure. Among its drawbacks are the fact that the cardinality alone of each set K y defined above gives no feel for the numerical probabilities of its elements. In addition, the operational meaning of averaging over y may be questioned. As an example of an operational security measure, we suggest the following 'Π− function' defined, as a function of the data length n for a given attack on a given cipher as:
Thus, Π(n) is Eve's probability on the most likely key maximized over all possible ciphertext observations of length n. As such, for a chosen ǫ, if it can be shown that Π ≤ ǫ for the data length of operation, the user can be guaranteed that the system is broken with a probability not greater than ǫ no matter what observation Eve gets. In this paper, we do not study the Πfunction as a security measure since the results on N k , both those available and those proven here, are closer in spirit and content to the claims of [1] and are sufficient to point out the inadequacies in their arguments.
N k can be estimated exactly for the Shannon random cipher and equals (see [7] ):
where D is the per symbol data redundancy in bits, i.e.,
Note that N k never becomes exactly zero, so the cipher is never broken with probability one. However, Shannon took the point where N k = 1 to be the 'unicity distance' n 0 , so that n 0 = H(K)/D using the approximation in Eq.
.
For the case of an arbitrary endomorphic nonrandom cipher, i.e., one for which X = Y, the following result due to Hellman and Beauchemin and Brassard holds (see [8] ):
Theorem 1 (HBB result) For any nonrandom cipher with X = Y,
Note that, in contrast to Eq. (8), the RHS of Eq. (10) can reach zero. However, since Theorem 1 gives just a lower bound on N k , the vanishing of its RHS does not establish insecurity in any conceivable definition. The approximate equality of the right hand sides of (8) and (10) led Hellman [7] to state that Shannon "random ciphers are essentially the worst possible" in the sense of having the lowest possible N k .
Under some restricted assumptions that we do not get into here, Hellman goes further and gives upper bounds on the probability that N k ≤ m for any integer m. These can obviously be translated into lower bounds on the probability that N k > m. We do not give the expressions here, because the important point in our context is that, to judge the insecurity level of a cipher, we would rather be interested in upper bounds on the probability Pr[N k > m] which are not available in the analyses [7] and [8] or elsewhere.
In sum, the available results on N k for nonrandom ciphers are only lower bounds. As such, they cannot in principle be used to establish insecurity of a system, but may conceivably be used in conjunction with a meaningful security measure to ensure a certain security level.
Lower Bound on N k for Random Ciphers
The HBB result quoted above can be extended to include random ciphers with arbitrary ciphertext alphabet Y, including continuous alphabet ciphers such as αη. We prove the extended lower bound in this section. In Section 3, it will be shown that the analysis of Ahn and Birnbaum may be interpreted as the calculation of this lower bound.
We need the following lemma:
Lemma 1: For any cipher with plaintext sequence X n = X 1 . . . X n , ciphertext sequence Y n = Y 1 . . . Y n , and key K, with arbitrary plaintext alphabet X and arbitrary ciphertext alphabet Y, random or non-random, H(K|Y n ) = H(X n ) + H(K) − I(X n K; Y n ).
Proof:
In Eq. (11), we have set H(X n |KY n ) = 0 from eq. (2). Note that the derivation is valid even for random ciphers because only the decryption condition has been used. The result can be justified also for continuous alphabets Y. Although quantities such as H(Y n ) are undefined in this case, they appear along with compensatory terms like H(KY n ) of opposite sign, so that the difference is well-defined, similar to the case of mutual information between a discrete and a continuous random variable [9] .
Theorem 2: For any cipher with plaintext sequence X n = X 1 . . . X n , ciphertext sequence Y n = Y 1 . . . Y n , and key K, with arbitrary plaintext alphabet X and arbitrary ciphertext alphabet Y, random or non-random,
D is defined as before by Eq. (9) . Note that Theorem 1 can be recovered from (17) by observing that I(X n K; Y n ) ≤ n log 2 |Y| = n log 2 |X | when X = Y.
Proof: We proceed as in [8] . We have
The inequality (19) follows from the definition eq. (5) of N k (y) and (20) from the concavity of the log function [9] . The result follows on substituting for H(K|Y n ) using Lemma 1 and exponentiating both sides.
It is worthwhile to examine when the inequality of Theorem 2 is satisfied with equality. Inequality (19) is an equality if and only if the keys in the set K y are equiprobable for every y. Inequality (20) is an equality if and only if |K y | is the same for all ciphertexts y, i.e., the number of possible keys leading to a ciphertext y is independent of y. Intuitively, these constraints, especially the one on (19), would not be satisfied for an arbitrary cipher, so the lower bound cannot be expected to be tight without a detailed analysis on the given cipher.
We have extended the HBB result to random ciphers and observed that it is still just a lower bound on the average number of spurious keys and cannot therefore provide a basis for an insecurity claim. In Section 3, we show that the correct interpretation of the claims of Ahn and Birnbaum are lower bounds obtainable from Theorem 2 and similarly do not imply insecurity of the system.
Application to αη and the analysis of Ahn & Birnbaum
We assume the description of the αη cryptosystem to be familiar to the reader from [1] -we use essentially the same notations here. Further details on the system may be found in [2, 3, 4, 5] . While the analysis of [1] is presumably confined to the case where a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is used as the pseudo-random number generator (referred to as ENC hereafter) or key expander, it will be instructive to consider the general case. We will subsequently draw conclusions specific to the LFSR case at the appropriate places.
In order to estimate the lower bound in Theorem 2, one needs to estimate I(X n K; Y n ) for the cipher being studied. For αη, it is useful to define a signal random variable S n = S 1 . . . S n as
where f (n) is simply the function of the data n-sequence and the key that outputs the corresponding n-sequence of signal angles on the coherent state circle. f (n) depends on the particular ENC used, but its explicit form does not concern us here. Each S i is an M-ary random variable. Now the ciphertext Y n = Y 1 . . . Y n is the n-sequence of continuous-variable heterodyne measurements made by Eve, and may be represented as
where R n = R 1 . . . R n , and the {R i } are independent identically distributed random variables having an approximately Gaussian distribution with zero mean and standard deviation σ = M 2 √ N , N being the mean photon number of each transmitted coherent state. They represent the heterodyne measurement noise of each symbol i. For this two-step model of generation of the ciphertext, note that, for each i, (X i K) → S i → Y i is a Markov chain, and hence so is Y i → S i → (X i K) and consequently, Y n → S n → (X n K). Therefore, by the data processing inequality [9] , we have for all n, I(X n K; Y n ) ≤ I(S n ; Y n ).
(24)
Let us denote the running key sequence emitted by an arbitrary ENC seeded with a seed key of length |K| by K ′ = K ′ 1 . . . K ′ n . . ., where each K ′ i is of length log 2 (M/2) bits -the length needed to choose a basis on the coherent state circle. It is clear that the {K ′ i }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n cannot be statistically independent beyond a certain n if each bit in the running key has a uniform marginal distribution (as is the case for a pseudo-random number generator), since the seed key entropy is limited to |K| and the running key is a deterministic function of the seed key. This fact shows that, for an arbitrary ENC, there exists a running key length n dep measured in running-key symbols, beyond which {K ′ i }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n are statistically dependent, and that
for an arbitrary ENC. n dep is referred to as the 'dependency distance'. When a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is used as an ENC, knowing any |K| consecutive bits of the output running key fixes the seed key and vice versa. Therefore, for an LFSR, n dep = |K|/ log 2 (M/2) ≡ n dep (LF SR). Note also that if the {K ′ i }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n are statistically dependent, so are the signal random variables {S i }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Ciphertext-only heterodyne attack
Consider first the case of ciphertext-only heterodyne attack on αη, for which D = 0. Also the plaintext alphabet size |X | = 2 for αη. Ahn and Birnbaum calculate in [1] , a quantity U, that is, in our notation :
This definition makes sense for the LFSR case (it needs a proof in the general case) because the {S i } do indeed have the same (uniform) marginal distributions for each i when the plaintext is uniformly random. It is also true that I(S n ; Y n ) = nU for all n ≤ n dep because, for such data lengths, the i-th signal symbol in the n-sequence is statistically independent of the rest as mentioned above. However, this information estimate that is linear in n is not valid beyond the dependency distance because the running key has correlations beyond n dep . The argument in [1] that the "pseudo-random number generator redistributes Eve's prior probabilities back to the flat distribution for each new symbol" merely makes U of Eq. (26) well-defined but does not justify the above estimate. It is the joint probability distribution of the {S i } that goes into the calculation of I(S n ; Y n ) and not the marginal per symbol probability distribution. In fact, it follows from Theorem 4.2.1 of [9] that
and the inequality is strict because the {S i } are not statistically independent.
Even if I(X n K; Y n ) is taken to be equal to I(S n ; Y n ) (see eq. (24)), the claim in [1] that the former quantity increases linearly up to n 0 = |K|/U cannot be true. Note that U ≈ 1 2 log 2 N +1.6 ≪ log 2 M in the regime σ = M/(2 √ N) ≫ 1 assumed in the calculation of [1] and thus n 0 ≫ n dep (LF SR), and thus we are already well into the region where (27) is a strict inequality. This argument is unchanged for a general ENC by virtue of the inequality (25) -the running-key dependency sets in not later than it does for the LFSR case.
Therefore, the only conclusion on I(X n K; Y n ) derivable from the analysis of [1] is that
Using this in conjunction with Theorem 2 yields the following lower bound on N k :
If we choose to find the data length n 'unicity' at which the lower bound reads N k ≥ 0, we find
which is claimed in [1] to be the 'unicity distance' of αη, beyond which "Eve's entropy on the key will transition from linear decline to asymptotic decay by analogy to the unicity distance of a classical deterministic cipher..." It is also claimed that "Eve may have enough information to determine the key with high probability when n ≫ n 'unicity' ."
There are several things amiss with such claims. The fact that the linear decline of Eve's entropy on the key has already ended at n dep has been noted. More importantly, the analogy with Shannon's random cipher does not exist. As stressed in Sections 2 and 3, for concrete ciphers, the only available results are lower bounds on N k to which the analysis of [1] is no exception. As a matter of principle, a lower bound on N k cannot prove insecurity of a cipher. If Ahn and Birnbaum wish to claim that N k is indeed close to zero at n 'unicity' , they must show both the reasons why the bound of Theorem 2 is tight for αη and also why I(X n K; Y n ) . = nU is a good approximation for αη beyond n = n dep . Also, if N k is not claimed to be exactly zero (so the key is not determined with probability one -it is shown in Subsection 3.2 below that N k for αη is never exactly zero for any finite data length n under known-plaintext heterodyne attack and consequently also for the weaker ciphertext-only attack), Ahn and Birnbaum need to estimate the probability with which Eve obtains the key correctly. As per the discussion of Sections 2 and 3, this probability can be determined for Shannon's random cipher but has never been done for any standard cipher, let alone αη. Without such a calculation, a statement like "Eve may have enough information to determine the key with high probability when n ≫ n 'unicity' ." is simply a tautology -it is scientifically meaningless without quantifying both how high the probability is and how much greater than n 'unicity' n needs to be.
Statistical and Known-Plaintext Attacks
For general statistical attacks, i.e., those for which H(X n ) < n, Ahn and Birnbaum claim that a simple additive stream cipher (ASC) is broken "with high probability" when
and, by comparison, αη is broken "with high probability" when
These assertions are again justified by analogy to Shannon's random cipher analysis, and are interpreted as implying that αη is broken at smaller data lengths than the ASC because of the added factor of (U + 1) in equation (32).
As before, it is evident that such claims are meaningless unless "high probability" and "≫" are quantified. As with standard ciphers under many statistical attacks, by choosing n large enough, we can drive the probability of finding the key as close to 1 as desired 1 , but without numerical estimates of the probability, this statement is uninformative.
The correct interpretations of equations (31) and (32) follow from an application of our Theorem 2. For the ASC, we have trivially that I(X n K; Y n ) ≤ H(Y n ) ≤ n. Substituting this into the RHS of Theorem 2 gives the lower bound
which is just the HBB result. As we did for ciphertext-only attacks, setting the lower bound to zero gives the condition (compare (31) )
that must be satisfied if N k = 0. As such, this is simply a necessary condition for N k = 0 and does not imply the latter.
For αη, using Eq. (27) in Theorem 2 and rewriting D in terms of H(X n ) gives the lower bound
Setting the RHS to zero, gives the necessary condition (compare (32) )
for N k = 0. It is not a sufficient condition for the latter, which, as we show below, is never true except at n = ∞ even for known-plaintext attacks. As is the case for all applications of Theorem 2, there is no proof that N k approximately equals the RHS of Eq. (35) which would be needed to make insecurity claims on its basis. Again, it is essential to provide estimates of the probability that the key is found correctly by Eve to prove insecurity.
Indeed, there is no evidence that (32) is valid as an approximate estimate of 'unicity distance'. The numerical result quoted in [1] for the simulation of [10] yields a 'unicity distance' too small by a factor ∼ 300, which shows U ∼ 1 when (32) is used instead of U ∼ 300. While such comparison has little meaning when the attack success probability is not specified, it surely is unreasonable to claim, as in [1] , that such a large discrepancy exists because of the suboptimal processing used in [10] .
Intuitively, the measurement noise in αη would make it more secure than an additive stream cipher instead of worse as claimed in [1] at least for the case least for a large class of ENC's including the LFSR.
of known-plaintext attacks where H(X n ) = 0. In this case, an ASC is broken with probability 1 at the nondegeneracy distance n d defined in [2] , which is just n d = |K| for an LFSR. On the other hand, it is clearly not possible to pin down the seed key at this n with probability 1 in the case of αη. As a matter of fact, the true unicity point of αη using any ENC, i.e., the point where the key is determined with probability one, is infinite under even known-plaintext attacks. To see this, note that, irrespective of what ENC is, in the more exact continuous Gaussian-noise model of the noise R i used in [1] (as opposed to the wedge approximation used in [3] ), there is always a non-zero probability, however small, that a Y n that is close to any given n-sequence of signal points on the coherent state circle may arise from any data sequence X n and any running key and thus seed key K. Furthermore, a large fraction (in terms of probability) of such events for Eve occur without giving rise to any detection error for Bob. In particular, the close approximation to R i consisting of a continuous probability distribution cut off at 90 0 on each side of the signal point S i would give zero error for Bob and infinite unicity distance because every allowed basis n-sequence is still possible given the ciphertext, albeit some are highly unlikely. The above argument shows that the true unicity point is not reached for any finite n. Together with the fact that lim n→∞ N k = 0 that we do not prove here, we have that the unicity distance is infinite. This fact that N k = 0 for any specified finite distance underscores the necessity of providing probability estimates to any claims that the system is broken at that distance. These estimates are not provided in [1] and seem very difficult to obtain.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have shown that the arguments of Ahn and Birnbaum, when interpreted correctly, are nothing more than expressions of the lower bound on N k (Theorem 2), and being lower bounds, cannot in principle establish insecurity of any system. We have also noted the lack of any estimates of the probability that αη is broken at the claimed distance to be a serious loophole insofar as it makes their claim of insecurity vacuous.
There are other points mentioned in [1] that we disagree with but cannot get into in any detail here. One concerns the comparison of αη with DSR to an ASC, and another about the existence of a proven secure concrete BB84 cryptosystem. In conclusion, we reiterate that although we believe the unmodified αη is information-theoretically insecure under ciphertext-only attacks and heterodyne measurements, quantitative estimates of its security, either in terms of the Π-function defined here or otherwise, are as yet unavailable. While the work in [1] does not throw light on the true security level of αη, we welcome further efforts in this direction.
